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1 Introduction
In the past decade a lot of work has been done both in terms of theory and in terms of
empirics of two-sided markets; see, for instance, Rochet and Tirole (2003); Armstrong (2006);
Rysman (2004); Kaiser and Wright (2006). However, most of these papers specify utility as a
linear function of network eﬀects and all the empirical ones use parametric speciﬁcations, see
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007); Kaiser and Wright (2006). More precisely, the externality
exerted on side one by side two is assumed to be linear in the number of agents on side two
and vice versa. In this paper we develop a structural model for two-sided markets where
we do not specify any functional form for the network eﬀects and we estimate them with
nonparametric instrumental variables estimation. This results in an ill-posed inverse problem
which is solved using the Tikhonov Regularization scheme. The nonparametric speciﬁcation
of network eﬀects allows us to capture nonlinearities and non-monotonicities in the network
eﬀect function with the increasing number of agents on the other side. The results of both
nonparametric and nonlinear parametric estimation show that network eﬀects are not linear.
The implications of this result for misspeciﬁed parametric models are demonstrated with a
numerical illustration.
The main feature of a two-sided market is the existence of externalities between the two
sides of the market. More precisely, the beneﬁt of agents on one side of the platform depends
on the number of agents on the other side. However, as is pointed out in Rochet and Tirole
(2003), a market with network externalities is a two-sided market if platforms can eﬀectively
cross-subsidize between diﬀerent categories of end users. So, it is not only the interdependence
of the sides to enter the platform but also the pricing structure of the platform which deﬁnes
a market as two (or multi) sided. So far various industries have been examined under this
setting: media, academic journals, dating agencies, credit cards, shopping malls, etc, see
Rochet and Tirole (2003); Anderson and Coate (2005); Dubois et al. (2007). For example,
in the newspaper industry, the decision of advertisers to advertise in a particular newspaper
depends on the circulation rate of that newspaper. On the other side of the market, the
readers may care about the advertising content of the newspaper they buy. The platform,
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namely the newspaper, can use this interdependence between the two sides when deciding
on its pricing scheme. In this case, it is going to be more aggressive with the readers if the
advertisers beneﬁt more from contacting the readers on the platform.
While in some industries, the network eﬀect is continuously increasing, in some other
industries it is nonlinear and non-monotone. For example, in the credit card industry, where
the credit card is the platform and buyers and sellers are the two sides, increasing the number
of sellers who accept the credit cards would unambiguously increase the beneﬁt and thus the
number of buyers who hold a credit card. However, when we think of the magazine market,
although it is found that readers get utility from seeing adverts in a magazine (see Kaiser and
Wright, 2006; Kaiser and Song, 2009), increasing the share of ad pages relative to content
pages may start to give disutility to readers and thus make them leave the platform. In this
case, the positive network externality for readers may become negative after some threshold
level of ads. These network externalities play a crucial role in the platform’s decision of
pricing scheme since a price change for one side does not only aﬀect the agents on that side,
but it also aﬀects the agents on the other side through the network eﬀects. More concretely,
the pricing equations of the platform can be explained by the usual Lerner index plus an
extra term coming from the relationship with the other side of the market. An empirical
study where the network eﬀects are speciﬁed linearly may give misleading results if in fact we
have nonlinear and non-monotonic network eﬀects. In the case of nonlinear and monotonic
network eﬀects where the speciﬁcation is linear, the misspeciﬁcation will lead to quantitative
errors, such as under or over estimation of the markup which in turn may result in erroneous
conclusions about the market power of the platform. The case of nonmonotonicity can even
be more crucial for two-sided markets, since the nonmonotonic network eﬀect functions can
be a source for the emergence of many platforms. An empirical study with a parametric
speciﬁcation of network eﬀects may not uncover the true structure of the market and may
therefore lead to erroneous conclusions in the analysis.1
In order to address this important issue, we set up a semiparametric model, in which we
1Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) study in detail how multiple platforms co-exist where heterogeneity in the
consumer valuation of the network externality is an important ingredient.
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include the network eﬀects nonparametrically in the demand functions. This speciﬁcation
can show whether the increasing number of agents on one side may eﬀect the participation
decision of the agents on the other side negatively or positively. In addition to this, we do not
specify any probability distribution function for the net beneﬁts of agents, which leads to non-
parametrically speciﬁed demand functions. We therefore estimate the network eﬀect functions
and the demand functions of the two sides nonparametically. To the best of our knowledge,
neither the functional speciﬁcation of the network eﬀects nor the nonparametric approach has
been used in the empirical two-sided market literature before. More broadly, nonparametric
approaches have not yet been used in the empirical analysis of network industries.
Nonparametric estimation has gained a lot of attention as it has many advantages. First
of all, the model is not approximated by a ﬁnite set of parameters and hence not aﬀected by
any speciﬁcation error. Secondly, the estimation results do not rely on parametric restrictions
and show us if the economic model is really supported by the data or not. We estimate the
functions of interest by nonparametric IV estimation allowing for the endogenous variables to
enter the model both parametrically and nonparametrically. However, it is well known that
nonparametric IV estimation causes an ill-posed inverse problem which needs to be regularized
(Darolles et al., 2011; Horowitz, 2011; Newey and Powell, 2003, See). There are many papers
in the literature that cope with this problem with diﬀerent regularization schemes. Following
the approach of Darolles et al. (2011), we regularize our inverse problem with Tikhonov
Regularization and estimate the unknown density functions of the variables with kernels.
Depending on the regularity of the function, this may give an optimal convergence rate or
slower, but it does prevent the possible speciﬁcation errors coming from the misspeciﬁcation
of the parametric form.
Although there are advantages of nonparametric speciﬁcation and estimation, its use may
also have limitations especially in empirical I.O., such as diﬃculty to make policy analysis
and/or simulations in the absence of parameters. In those cases nonparametric approaches can
still be used to inform the researcher on the functional forms of the model. We perform a para-
metric estimation whose functional speciﬁcations are based on the nonparametric estimation
4
results. More precisely, using the same structural equations, we approximate the unknown
functions by nonlinear parametric forms, and estimate demand equations simultaneously. The
results are consistent with what we have obtained in our nonparametric analysis.
Three main groups of literature are related to this paper. The ﬁrst one is the two-sided
markets literature. The theoretical literature on two-sided markets has focused on credit card
markets, buyer-to-buyer platforms, academic journals and media. Moreover, in the theoretical
two-sided markets literature the network eﬀects are assumed to be linear most of the time, see
Rochet and Tirole (2003); Armstrong (2006); Weyl (2010); Anderson and Coate (2005). The
model we use in this paper is mostly related to that of Armstrong (2006), as it is more suitable
to the newspaper industry, though we do allow for nonlinear and non-monotonic network
eﬀects. Empirical studies have concentrated mostly on media. Kaiser and Wright (2006) and
Kaiser and Song (2009) analyze the magazine industry, whereas Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(2007) and Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) are examples from the newspaper industry. Rysman
(2004) uses a nonlinear speciﬁcation for network eﬀects in his paper where he examines the
market for Yellow Pages directories. In contrast to our paper, all these papers are using
parametric speciﬁcations.
There is also a vast amount of literature on the newspaper industry which started even
before the two-sided markets literature. Rosse (1970) is one of the ﬁrst papers who shows
empirically that there are network externalities between the readers and advertisers of daily
newspapers in the U.S. Thompson (1989) shows that advertising demand does not only depend
on circulation but also on the reader proﬁle of the newspaper. More recently, Fan (2013)
examines how the newspaper quality, subscription prices and ad rates are aﬀected by a change
of structure in the industry. In this paper, we are also examining the local daily newspaper
industry, however what we are interested in is the level of advertisements and/or readership
from which each side start to get disutility or utility. With our nonparametric speciﬁcation of
network eﬀects, we do not make a priori assumptions on the externality exerted on readers by
advertisers or vice versa. We search for a threshold level from where this externality changes its
sign. Our results show that the readers of the daily newspapers like advertisements, however,
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their beneﬁt starts to decrease after a certain amount of advertisements. On the other side
of the market, advertisers as well get higher beneﬁt with the higher readership and as in the
case of the readers’ side, their beneﬁts start to decrease after a threshold level of circulation.
The third group of related literature is on nonparametric estimation methods with en-
dogenous variables. Ai and Chen (2003), Newey and Powell (2003), Carrasco et al. (2007),
Darolles et al. (2011), Feve and Florens (2009), Florens and Sokullu (2014) all deal with the
problem of nonparametric IV estimation in the presence of endogenous variables. Although
Ai and Chen (2003) and Newey and Powell (2003) use sieve methods and get over the problem
of ill-posedness by putting bounds on integrals of higher order derivatives, all the other papers
use kernel estimation and regularize the ill-posed inverse problem by Tikhonov Regularization.
Florens and Sokullu (2014) is diﬀerent from the other ones, in the sense that they develop their
estimation technique for semiparametric transformation models. This paper also studies the
nonparametric estimation of semiparametric transformation models, however, diﬀerent from
Florens and Sokullu (2014), all explanatory variables in our system are endogenous. Note
that this extension can be relevant in many empirical models in economics as these can have
more than one endogenous variables, e.g. price and market shares in nested logit models.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model, derive the structural
demand equations for readers and advertisers and pricing equations of the platform. We
present our semi-parametric model, its identiﬁcation and estimation Section 3. Section 4,
presents the empirical analysis with semi-parametric and parametric speciﬁcations while in
Section 5, we present a numerical illustration to show the importance of misspeciﬁcation of
the two-sided network eﬀects. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are presented in
the Online Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce our model taking into account the fact that an agent on one
side will consider the number of agents on the other side when she makes her decision whether
to enter the platform or not. In this paper we use data from the local daily newspaper industry
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to perform our empirical analyses. The two-sided market model for the newspaper industry is
deﬁned as follows: Each local daily newspaper is a monopolist in the city in which the paper
is distributed. It produces content pages and ad pages for its readers and provides advertising
outlet for ﬁrms who want to reach the readers of the newspaper. It maximizes its proﬁts by
setting a daily price for the readers and an advertising rate for the advertisers. Readers decide
to buy the newspaper or not and ﬁrms decide to buy ad space from the newspaper or not, by
looking at their net beneﬁts. As it is a two-sided industry, the beneﬁts of readers depend on
the amount of advertisements in the newspaper and the beneﬁts of advertisers depend on the
number of readers of the newspaper, as well as some other newspaper characteristics.
We obtain the demand functions of readers and advertisers following the approach used
by Larribeau (1993) and Feve et al. (2008). Let us begin with the reader side. We assume
that the readers are heterogeneous in their net beneﬁt bri of buying the newspaper and these
beneﬁts are drawn from a continuous distribution. Each reader i decides to buy the local
daily newspaper if her net beneﬁt is higher than a threshold (say, her net costs) br:
bri ≥ br(Na,X,U)
where br(.) is the threshold beneﬁt level for readers which is a function of the share of advertis-
ers on the same platform Na, the observable newspaper characteristics X and the newspaper
characteristics that are unobservable by the econometrician, U . All readers whose net beneﬁts
are higher than this threshold will buy the newspaper. Thus, the probability of buying the
newspaper and hence the market share of readers is given by:
N r = P (bri ≥ br(Na,X,U)) = 1− F r(br(Na,X,U)) (1)
where F r(.) is the cdf of the net beneﬁts of readers. We can rewrite equation (1) as:
N r = Sr(br(Na,X,U)) (2)
where Sr(.) = 1 − F r(.) is the survival function. Equation (2) gives the demand of readers
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for the newspaper. We assume that it is strictly decreasing in the threshold beneﬁt level.
Given the distribution of beneﬁts of readers, the higher the threshold is, the less readers buy
the newspaper. Furthermore, if the observable magazine characteristics are price and number
of content pages, we expect the threshold beneﬁt level to be increasing in cover price and
decreasing in the number of content pages thus the demand is decreasing in cover price and
increasing in number of content pages. The eﬀect of the share of ad pages is ambiguous, since
the readers may like the ads or not depending on the readers’ tastes.
Now, let us consider the advertisers. Each advertiser j has a net beneﬁt baj from advertising
in the local newspaper and these net beneﬁts are drawn from a continuous distribution F a(.).
They advertise in the newspaper if their net beneﬁt is higher than ba, i.e:
baj ≥ ba(N r,W, V )
where ba(.) is the threshold beneﬁt level for advertisers and it is a function of the share of
readers of the newspaper N r, observable newspaper characteristics for advertisers W and the
newspaper characteristics that are unobservable by the econometrician, V . Like in the case
of readers, the probability of advertising in the newspaper and thus the share of advertisers
who join the newspaper is given by2:
Na = P (baj ≥ ba(N r,W, V )) = Sa(ba(N r,W, V )) (3)
where Sa(.) = 1 − F a(.). Equation (3) is the demand equation of advertisers for the local
newspaper. It is strictly decreasing in the threshold beneﬁt function. The threshold beneﬁt
function is expected to be increasing in the ad rate and decreasing in the share of readers.
So, more ﬁrms would like to advertise in a newspaper with a higher readership and a lower
ad rate.
2In the application we deﬁne the market size for the advertising side as the total number of pages in the
monopolist local daily newspaper, hence the share of advertisers who join the platform will be equal to the
share of ad pages in the newspaper.
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Now, we can write the demand system for the newspaper:
N r = Sr(br(Na,X,U)) (4)
Na = Sa(ba(N r,W, V )) (5)
Given the demand equations of both sides, the monopolist local newspaper chooses its
cover price and advertising rate to maximize its proﬁt:
max
P r,P a
Π = max
P r,P a
{P rN rM r + P aNaMa −C(N rM r, NaMa, IP )− FC} (6)
where P (i) and M (i), i = a, r are price and market size for both sides, C is the cost function
which depends on the number of agents on each side as well as other cost variables such as
input prices, IP , and FC is the ﬁxed costs. The maximization problem in equation (6) gives
the following pricing equations:
P r − ∂C∂Nr
P r
= − 1
Nr
−
(
P a − ∂C∂Na
)
∂Na
∂P r
∂Nr/∂P r
P r
(7)
P a − ∂C∂Na
P a
= − 1
Na
−
(
P r − ∂C∂Nr
)
∂Nr
∂P a
∂Na/∂P a
P a
(8)
where Nr and Na are price elasticity of reader demand and price elasticity of advertiser
demand, respectively. It should be noted that both equations (7) and (8) are modiﬁed versions
of the Lerner Index, in the sense that they also include the network externalities coming from
the two-sidedness of the industry. For example, for the reader side, the mark-up (the term
on the left hand side), which is the ability of the newspaper to price over its marginal cost,
depends on the inverse price elasticity of the readers, 1/Nr as well as on a second term.
This second term captures the externality that readers have on advertisers. If they exert a
positive externality on advertisers, the newspaper charges readers a lower price compared to
a situation where this externality is ignored. The intuition is simple. By lowering the cover
price, the newspaper can attract more readers which in turn attract more advertisers through
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network externalities, thus increasing the proﬁts of the newspaper. Put diﬀerently, as Weyl
(2010) shows, the newspaper indeed still picks the price where marginal revenue is equal to
marginal cost. However, in this special case, the marginal revenue and marginal cost have
extra terms coming from the network externalities between the two sides.
It is therefore important to identify the sign and magnitude of the externalities as they
play a crucial role in pricing. In the next section, where we conduct an empirical analysis
of the industry, we specify the network eﬀects as unknown functions to be able to see if the
exerted externality changes sign with an increasing number of ad pages or not.
3 A Semiparametric Model and Estimation
In this section, we introduce the model and the nonparametric IV estimator we use to do
the empirical analysis of the local daily newspaper industry.
3.1 Model Specification
The daily newspaper industry has been studied extensively since the 1960’s. Rosse (1970),
which is one of the most inﬂuential papers, shows empirically that circulation and advertising
depends positively on each other in the U.S. daily newspaper industry. Ferguson (1983)
then supports this idea by ﬁnding that circulation demand depends not only on quantity
but also on the value of information provided by retail advertising. Nonetheless, when we
consider more recent literature, Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of advertisements on reader demand for Italian newspapers. Neither does Fan (2013)
who studies daily newspapers in the U.S. On the other side of the market, the dependence
of the advertising demand on circulation has always been found to be positive, although
Thompson (1989) shows that the demand for display advertisement can be sensitive to the
paper’s readership proﬁle.3 In this section our aim is to see if these network externalities
between the two sides change sign as the share of agents on each side increases, rather than to
3There are two main types of advertising: Display advertising and classiﬁed advertising. Display advertising
can appear throughout the paper and usually involves illustrations. Classiﬁed advertising mostly appears on
special pages under the relevant heading for the advertised items, see Ferguson (1983).
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see if it is negative or positive. So, instead of making a linear parametric speciﬁcation for two
sided network eﬀects, we specify them with nonparametric functions to be able to capture the
variation in network externality with the variation in the share of agents on the other side.
Evans and Schmalensee (2008) and Argentesi and Ivaldi (2005) point out that failure to
account for network externalities in two-sided platforms can lead to serious errors in antitrust
analysis. Correct speciﬁcation of these network eﬀects is important for the same reason. How-
ever, none of the aforementioned papers on the daily newspaper industry allows for nonlinear
and nonmonotone network eﬀects in the utility function of agents. It is straightforward to see
e.g. in case of nonlinearity or non-monotonicity of the network eﬀect functions, the results
of Kaiser and Song (2009) regarding the elasticities would not be the same.4 Rysman (2004)
adopts a nonlinear speciﬁcation for network eﬀect functions. However, his speciﬁcation does
not allow for non-monotonicity. It can be easily shown that, if non-monotonicities exist in
the network eﬀect functions, the market equilibrium condition he derives would be harder to
satisfy, i.e. it may not be satisﬁed for all values of the advertisements. Thus, his results may
not hold anymore if the network eﬀect of advertisers on consumers are nonmonotone.
In this semiparametric model speciﬁcation, we make as few parametric approximations
as we can. First of all, we make no assumption on the family of distribution functions of
net beneﬁts of readers and advertisers. Secondly, we assume that network eﬀects are given
by some unknown functions, ϕ(Na) and ψ(N r). Finally we specify the threshold beneﬁt
functions br and ba as linear functions of network externalities and platform characteristics.
Then, the system of demand equations are given by the following:
N r = Sr(ϕ(Na) +Xβ + U) (9)
Na = Sa(ψ(N r) +Wγ + V ) (10)
4Suppose that the network eﬀects are speciﬁed as second order polynomials in Kaiser and Song (2009),
so that the mean utility is given by: δjt = Xjtβ + θ0 + θ1Adjt + θ2Ad
2
jt − αpjt + γt + ηj + ξjt instead of
δjt = Xjtβ + θAdjt − αpjt + γt + ηj + ξjt. In the ﬁrst case the advertising elasticity of demand will be given
by (θ1 + 2θ2Adjt)sjt(1 − sjt) whereas in the second case it will be given by θsjt(1 − sjt), where sjt is the
market share of magazine j on the readers’ side. Then for example, if θ2 is estimated to be negative and
‖θ1‖ < ‖2θ2Adjt‖ the elasticity would be negative compared to a case where θ is estimated to be positive.
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We are interested in estimating the network externalities between the two sides, hence for
simplicity, we consider just one platform characteristic, price, whose coeﬃcient is normalized
to one for identiﬁcation. The reason to use just one characteristic is that since we use kernels
in estimation, increasing the dimension of endogenous and/or exogenous variables complicates
the estimation process. Note that this way of speciﬁcation does not allow us to analyze the
elasticities however in this paper we are interested in identifying the shape of the network
eﬀect functions and we can make this normalization without loss of generality. This ﬁnal
speciﬁcation gives us the equations we are going to estimate:
N r = Sr(ϕ(Na) + P r + U) (11)
Na = Sa(ψ(N r) + P a + V ) (12)
where P r is the daily price of the newspaper and P a is the ad rate per column-inch.
We will estimate the functions of interest, namely, Sr, Sa, ϕ and ψ nonparametrically.
3.2 Identification
In this section we closely follow Florens and Sokullu (2014). The assumptions needed for
identiﬁcation of nonparametric IV models are quite standard, see Darolles et al. (2011); Newey
and Powell (2003); Florens and Sokullu (2014); Berry and Haile (2014). Before proceeding to
discuss identiﬁcation, we introduce our variables and some notation.
N r, Na ∈ R are the endogenous market shares of the newspaper on the readers’ and
advertisers’ side, respectively. The platform characteristics for readers and advertisers, which
we denote by X and W in equations (9) and (10), can be endogenous or exogenous. These
characteristics generally include prices on both sides, newshole, number of reporters, edition
dummy indicating if it is a morning or evening paper, etc. (see Fan, 2013). As already
mentioned, for simplicity, we include just one platform characteristic in each function, namely
daily price (P r) and ad rate (P a). Thus, P r, P a ∈ R, are endogenous. Let Zr ∈ Rqr and
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Za ∈ Rqa denote instruments for each equation and Z = {Zr, Za}.5 Finally, unobservable
newspaper characteristics for each side, U and V are scalars as well.
We assume that (N r, Na, P r, P a, Z) generate a random vector, Ξ, whose density is square
integrable and which has a cumulative distribution function F . Then for each F , we can deﬁne
subspaces of our variables as L2F (N
r), L2F (N
a), L2F (P
r), L2F (P
a) and L2F (Z) which belong to
a common Hilbert space. That is, L2F (Z) denotes the subspace of L
2
F of real valued functions
depending on Z only. In the sequel, we use the notation L2Z to denote the L
2
F (Z).
Now we can state the needed assumptions for identiﬁcation.
Assumption 1 Strict monotonicity. The survival function Sq(d), q ∈ {r, a} is strictly
decreasing in d.
As S is a survival function, we know that it is decreasing, however, by making the assump-
tion of ”strictly decreasing”, we guarantee to have a unique inverse of it, which we will use
for identiﬁcation and estimation. Thus, using Assumption 1, we can rewrite the system of
equations in (11) and (12) as:
Hr(N r) = ϕ(Na) + P r + U (13)
Ha(Na) = ψ(N r) + P a + V (14)
where Hq(N q) = (Sq)−1(N q) for q = a, r.
Assumption 2 Conditional mean independence. E[U |Zr] = 0 and E[V |Za] = 0
Assumption 3 Completeness. (N r, Na) are strongly identiﬁed by Zq for q = a, r:
∀m(N r, Na) ∈ L2Nr×L2Na , E[m(N r, Na)|Zq] = 0 ⇒ m(N r, Na) = 0 a.s for q ∈ {a, r}
Assumption 4 Measurable separability. N r and Na are measurably separable:
∀m ∈ L2Nr , l ∈ L2Na ,m(N r) = l(Na) ⇒ m(.) = l(.) = constant
5The instruments will be introduced in the application.
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Assumption 5 Normalization.
∀l ∈ L2Na , l(.) = constant ⇒ constant = 0
∀m ∈ L2Nr ,m(.) = constant ⇒ constant = 0
For simplicity, we will assume that ϕ(.) and ψ(.) are normalized by the conditions E(ϕ(Na)) =
0 and E(ψ(N r)) = 0 . Under this assumption, the parametric space we consider is:
Eq0 =
{
(Hq, φ) ∈ L2Nr × L2Na such that E[φ] = 0, q = a, r
}
Assumption 2 is just a conditional mean independence condition. Assumption 3, Com-
pleteness is the nonparametric counterpart of the rank condition in parametric IV estimation
and it is also referred to as complete statistic in the statistics literature (See Lehmann and
Scheﬀe, 1950; Basu, 1955). It is a condition on the power of Zr and Za to identify Hr(.) and
ϕ(.) and Ha(.) and ψ(.), respectively. Intuitively, it means that there is no function of N r and
Na that is not correlated with any function of Zr and Za. The completeness assumption is an
assumption on the distribution of the endogenous variables conditionally on the instruments.
Although, in this paper we take it as given, further reference on the primitive conditions
for completeness can be found in D’ Haultfoeuille (2011), Andrews (2011) and Hu and Shiu
(2011). As it is shown by Hu and Shiu (2011), our completeness condition on the multivariate
distribution function of the endogenous variables can be obtained by the completeness on
univariate distribution functions and thus it is not very restrictive. Assumption 4, Measurable
separability, is needed to distinguish Hr(.) and ϕ(.) and Ha(.) and ψ(.). It says that for all
values of N r and Na, two functions m(N r) and l(Na) can be equal only if they are equal to a
constant. In other words, it states that there is no exact relation between N r and Na. So, for
the reader demand equation, Assumption 4 holds whenever P r+U has some components that
vary independently of Na and for the advertiser demand equation, it holds whenever P a + V
has some components that vary independently of N r. It is not hard to verify measurable
separability in our model. In the model, we already state that reader demand depends on the
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share of advertisers Na, daily price P r, as well as some unobservable newspaper characteristics
for readers, U . Hence, we do not make an unrealistic assumption by measurable separability,
as it is natural to expect that U includes some newspaper characteristics for readers that vary
independently of the share of advertisers. Moreover, with the same reasoning, it is natural
to expect that there exists some unobservable newspaper characteristics for advertisers that
vary independently of the share of readers. Finally, Assumption 5 is just a normalization
assumption for identiﬁcation.
Theorem 1 Under the assumptions 1-5, the functions Sr, Sa, ϕ and ψ are identiﬁed.
In this paper we are considering a fully recursive system of equations. For this reason we
now state extra assumptions that guarantee the existence of the reduced form solution of the
system. In other words, we show that N r and Na can be explained by the other variables of
the system for given cover price and ad rate. Blundell and Matzkin (2010) also discuss the
existence of a reduced form solution to the system of equations where they investigate the
control function approach in nonparametric nonseparable simultaneous equations models.
Remember that our structural system is given by equations (11) and (12).
We further make the following assumptions:
Assumption 6 For all values of N r, Na, P r, P a, U and V , the functions Sr and Sa are con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable.
This assumption requires that the net beneﬁts of readers and advertisers are distributed
continuously so that the survival functions will be continuously diﬀerentiable on the interval
(0, 1).
Assumption 7 For all values of N r, Na, P r, P a, U and V , we have: ∂S
r
∂Na
∂Sa
∂Nr < 1
This assumption is indeed a restriction on the magnitude of the network eﬀects. Note that
similar types of assumptions are made by Blundell and Matzkin (2010) and Filistrucchi and
Klein (2013). Blundell and Matzkin (2010) state that this assumption is to relax the common
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condition of the intersection of an upward and a downward sloping functions to determine the
value of the endogenous variables, which are in our case reader and advertiser demands.
Now, we can state the theorem for the existence of a reduced form solution:
Theorem 2 Under assumptions 1,6,7 and for given cover price and ad rate, there exist unique
functions hr and ha representing the structural model in equations (11) and (12), such that:
N r = hr(P r, P a, U, V ) and Na = ha(P r, P a, U, V )
The result of Theorem 2 has important implications in terms of the existence of a unique
equilibrium. For the given prices, the existence of unique functions for N r and Na which don’t
depend on each other, indeed shows that there exists a unique equilibrium in the coordination
game between the two sides of the market. This is an important result since it has already
been mentioned in the literature that demand may not be unique for given prices due to this
coordination problem (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Armstrong,
2006). Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) adopted a similar approach to ours to show that unique
reduced form demand equations exist for given prices. Given these reduced form demand
functions, one can rewrite the proﬁt function of the newspaper and then derive the conditions
that guarantee the concavity of the proﬁt function. We leave the derivation of these conditions
for future work since it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Remark 3 In this section we present the identiﬁcation of a separable model since we can-
not identify the network eﬀect functions separately in a nonseparable model. Nonetheless, we
present our model under a nonseparable framework and discuss its identiﬁcation and estima-
tion in Online Appendix A.
3.3 Nonparametric Estimation of Semiparametric Transformation Equa-
tions
We estimate equations (13) and (14) with the nonparametric instrumental variable estima-
tor for semiparametric transformation models. As already stated, nonparametric IV regression
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has gained a lot of attention recently. The model we present in this section is diﬀerent from
those found in the existing literature in the sense that it covers a very general case. We
allow for nonparametric speciﬁcations on the right and left hand side of the transformation
model, as well as for endogeneity, and use the mean independence condition rather than full
independence. Although Horowitz (1996) and Linton et al. (2008) study the nonparamet-
ric estimation of transformation models, none of them consider the case of nonparametric
speciﬁcations on both sides of the regression equation. Our method is very similar to that of
Florens and Sokullu (2014), since both are nonparametric estimators of semiparametric trans-
formation models which allow for nonparametric speciﬁcations on both sides of the equation.
Florens and Sokullu (2014) consider a partially linear equation and assume that the para-
metric component is exogenous, i.e, they consider the model H(Y ) = ϕ(Z) +X + U where
E(U |Z) = 0 and E(U |X) = 0. In this paper, we consider the model given in Equations (13)
and (14) where E(U |Na) = 0; E(U |P r) = 0; E(V |N r) = 0 and E(V |P a) = 0. More precisely,
the parametric component is no longer assumed to be exogenous. Given this diﬀerence, the
convergence rates of the operators as well as the proof of consistency are adapted to our case.
Diﬀerent from Florens and Sokullu (2014), we show in detail how to implement the estima-
tor, though it should be noted that the implementation of a nonparametric IV estimator is
now commonplace in the literature (see Darolles et al., 2011; Florens et al., 2009; Feve and
Florens, 2009). Moreover, we show that under the assumption of a monotonic transformation
the estimation of Hr(.) and Ha(.) can be improved by monotonisation such as rearrangement.
We further obtain bootstrap conﬁdence intervals for a fully simultaneous system.
We follow a limited information approach while presenting nonparametric IV estimation
for transformation equations. In other words, we estimate the demand system given by
equations (13) and (14) equation by equation. For the rest of this section, we continue
to present the estimation method using equation (13) only. Extension to equation (14) is
straightforward. Estimation follows closely Florens and Sokullu (2014) Section 2.2 but here
we provide detailed discussion of the implementation of the method.
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By Assumptions 1 and 2, we can write our estimation problem as:
E[Hr(N r)− ϕ(Na)− P r|Zr] = 0 (15)
From now on, for ease of presentation we will work with operators. Let us deﬁne the
following operator:
T r : Er =
{
L2Nr × L˜2Na
}
→ L2Zr : T r(Hr, ϕ) = E[Hr − ϕ|Zr]
where L˜2Na =
{
ϕ ∈ L2Na : E(ϕ) = 0
}
. We use this projected space in order to satisfy the
normalization assumption for identiﬁcation, Assumption 5. Without this constraint on the
space we cannot identify the function ϕ. The inner product is deﬁned as:
〈(Hr1 , ϕ1), (Hr2 , ϕ2)〉 = 〈Hr1 ,Hr2〉+ 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉
The adjoint operator of T r, T r∗ satisﬁes:
〈T r(Hr, ϕ), ξ〉 = 〈(Hr, ϕ), T r∗ξ〉
for any (Hr, ϕ) ∈ Er and ξ ∈ L2Zr . From the equality above it follows immediately that
T r∗ξ = (E[ξ|N r],−PE[ξ|Na])
where P is the projection operator which project the functions of Na on the space where those
functions have zero mean. Formally: P : L2Na → L˜2Na : Pϕ = ϕ− E(ϕ). Since we assume that
the density of Ξ is square integrable, the operator T r, its adjoint operator, T r∗ and the two
self adjoint operators T r∗T r and T rT r∗ are all compact, see Darolles et al. (2011).
Now we can rewrite our estimation problem using the operator notation:
T r(Hr(N r), ϕ(Na)) = f r (16)
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where f r = E(P r|Zr).6 This equation is a Fredholm integral equation of the ﬁrst kind and the
solution needs the inversion of the operator T r. Since T r is a compact operator its inverse is
not continuous which will lead the solution not to be continuous either. This discontinuity
causes an ill-posed inverse problem. In other words, this equation violates one of the deﬁnitions
of the well-posedness of a problem.7 More precisely, as T r is a compact linear operator, it
has inﬁnitely many eigenvalues in the neighbourhood of zero, which makes the inverse of it,
(T r)−1 discontinuous.8 As a result, a very small change in the value of f r may lead the
solution to explode. Intuitively, in ﬁnite dimensional case, this problem amounts to having a
matrix M with zero eigenvalues and thus noninvertable.9
It should be noted that the reason of ill-posedness in this problem is the endogeneity of the
market share of the advertisers. If our model was instead Y = ϕ(X)+U with E(U |X) = 0, the
solution to ϕ(X) will be given by E(Y |X) = ϕ(X), which would not necessitate the inversion
of any operator. However, the case where E(U |X) = 0 the estimation of ϕ is an ill-posed
inverse problem.10 Equivalently, if we had endogeneity and we were doing parametric IV, this
would not cause an ill-posed inverse problem either since the operator we were using would
be a ﬁnite dimensional continuous operator whose inverse exists and is continuous.
To solve this ill-posed problem, we need to regularize it, i.e., we need to modify the operator
such that the solution is not unstable, and such that this amount of modiﬁcation approaches
to zero as the sample size increases. For this, we choose the Tikhonov Regularization scheme.
Under this regularization scheme, the norm of the solution is controlled by a penalty term, γ,
which is called regularization parameter. The ill-posed inverse problem literature oﬀers other
regularization schemes, as well (see Carrasco et al., 2007).
The regularized solution to the identifying relation in (16) is given by the following mini-
6Note that in the case of Florens and Sokullu (2014), we would have an exogenous variable X instead of
the P r and then the fr would be equal to E(X|X,Zr) = X.
7As deﬁned in Engl et al. (1996), a problem is well-posed if the deﬁnitions below hold:
(i) For all admissible data a solution exist.
(ii) For all admissible data the solution is unique.
(iii) The solution continuously depends on the data.
8See Theorem 7.22 and Theorem 7.23 in Ryanne and Youngson (2008).
9For a more detailed discussion see Horowitz (2011) which explains the ill-posedness using singular value
decomposition of the operators and demonstrates it with an example.
10This problem has been studied extensively by Darolles et al. (2011); Newey and Powell (2003); Hall and
Horowitz (2005).
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mization program:
min
Hr,ϕ
{
‖T r(Hr, ϕ) − f r‖2 + γrn ‖(Hr, ϕ)‖2
}
where γrn > 0 and γ
r
n converges to zero at a suitable rate. Hence,
(Hr(N r), ϕ(Na))′ = (γrnI + T
r∗T r)−1T r∗f r (17)
where I is the identity operator in L2Nr × L2Na . We can write the solution in (17) as follows:
(γrnI + T
r∗T r)(Hr(N r), φ(Na)) = T r∗f r (18)
Equivalently:
⎛
⎜⎝ γ
r
nH
r + E [E(Hr|Zr)|N r]− E [E(ϕ|Zr)|N r]
γrnϕ− PE [E(Hr|Zr)|Na] + PE [E(ϕ|Zr)|Na]
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝ E[E(P
r|Zr)|N r]
−PE[E(P r|Zr)|Na]
⎞
⎟⎠ (19)
To explain the implementation of the deﬁned method, suppose that we have an i.i.d.
sample of (N ri , N
a
i , P
r
i , P
a
i , Zi), i = 1, .., n. As we do not know the true distribution of our
variables, we need to replace the conditional expectations with their empirical counterparts.
Hence, we rewrite the system of equations with kernels.11 For the system in (19), let AZr
be the matrix whose (i,j)th element is:
AZr(i, j) =
KZr,hZr
(
Zri − Zrj
)
∑
j KZr,hZr
(
Zri − Zrj
) (20)
Let ANr and ANa be the matrices with the (i,j)th elements:
ANr(i, j) =
KNr ,hNr
(
N ri −N rj
)
∑
j KNr ,hNr
(
N ri −N rj
) (21)
11The deﬁnition of the multivariate kernel used in implementation can be found in Florens et al. (2009).
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ANa(i, j) =
KNa,hNa
(
Nai −Naj
)
∑
j KNa,hNa
(
Nai −Naj
) (22)
for some bandwidth parameters hNr , hNa and hZr . Moreover let Ap be the matrix with
n−1
n
on the diagonal and − 1n elsewhere. We can rewrite the system in (19) as:
⎛
⎜⎝ γ
r
nHˆ
r +ANrAZrHˆr −ANrAZr ϕˆ
γrnϕˆ−ApANaAZrHˆr +ApANaAZr ϕˆ
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝ ANrAZrP
r
−ApANaAZrP r
⎞
⎟⎠ (23)
Then the estimated functions are given by:
⎛
⎜⎝Hˆ
r
ϕˆ
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝γ
r
nI +ANrAZr −ANrAZr
−ApANaAZr γrnI +ApANaAZr
⎞
⎟⎠
−1⎛
⎜⎝ ANrAZrP
r
−ApANaAZrP r
⎞
⎟⎠ (24)
Equation (24) is a system of 2n equations in 2n unknowns which means that we can recover
Hˆr and ϕˆ, hence Sˆr. In the Online Appendix C, we prove that the estimator is consistent and
we compute its rate of convergence.
4 Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Daily Newspaper Industry
In this section we make an application of the nonparametric estimation deﬁned in the
previous section. Using the speciﬁcation in Section 3.1 and data on local daily newspapers
in the U.S., we estimate the network eﬀect functions nonparametrically.
4.1 Data
We have a two-sided market model of a monopoly platform, the daily newspaper industry
in the U.S. High ﬁxed costs are one of the main characteristics of this industry which leads to
monopolist newspapers in most of the markets (cities), see Editor & Publisher International
Databook (2012), Rosse (1970); Blair and Romano (1993).12
12In the previous version of this paper the application is done by using a dataset on German magazine
industry which was an oligopoly. We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out that the daily newspaper
market data from the U.S. would ﬁt our application better.
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Our data comes from three sources: Editor & Publisher International Databook (2012),
Kantar Media Intelligence and US Census Bureau. Daily average circulation, subscription
prices, frequency of edition, number of special editions and special weekly selections, average
number of pages and other newspaper characteristics are taken from Editor & Publisher
International Databook (2012). We get the information on advertising quantity in column-
inches and adrate per column-inch from Kantar Media Intelligence. Finally demographic
characteristics of cities are obtained from US Census Bureau. Although we have more than
1000 observations on circulation, daily price and newspaper characteristics, after matching it
with the advertising data we end up with a sample of 117 newspapers.
Table 1 present the summary statistics of our main variables. Advertising quantity is
measured in column-inches. The mean adrate in our sample is $62.44 per column-inch while
maximum and minimum rates are highly diﬀerent from this mean value at $8.71 and $238.9,
respectively. Mean daily subscription price is $0.54 with a minimum of $0.17 and a maximum
of $1.31. In the data, the circulation rate is given as the daily average over the six months
period covering April 1, 2011 to September 30, 2011. The average weekday circulation in our
data is 97769 and average advertising quantity per daily issue is 2473 column-inches which is
approximately 19.5 pages.13 Average total pages per issue is 57.5 which implies on average
about one third of the pages of a daily newspaper in the U.S. goes to advertising.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the data
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Circulation 97769.94 91077.02 5338 527568
N r 5.69× 10−3 6.13× 10−3 0.76× 10−3 3.68× 10−2
Daily price 0.54 0.174 0.254 1.31
Advertising (c-inches) 2473.08 1387.85 23.46 7219.88
Na 0.36 0.17 0.003 0.85
Adrate 62.44 47.68 8.71 238.90
Page number per issue 57.56 27.63 13 240
We deﬁne the market size for the readers as the population of the city. However, when
we construct the readers’ share variable we obtain numbers greater than 1. To deal with this
issue we change the deﬁnition of the market size, instead we assume that it is proportional
13Fan (2013) points out that a typical US daily newspaper page has 6 columns with 21 inch depth, so
average number of ad pages is given by: advertising quantity in column-inces/126.
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to the population by a factor 100. On the advertisers’ side the market size is assumed to
be all pages in the newspaper, thus the advertisers’ share is obtained by dividing advertising
quantity by the total column inches in the newspaper.
Remark 4 We have a sample with 117 observations to estimate our model nonparametrically.
In Online Appendix D, we present a simulation to show that the estimation method we propose
performs well with a sample of 100 observations.
4.2 Semiparametric Estimation
In this section we estimate the network externality functions ϕ(.) and ψ(.) as well as the
inverse survival functions Hr(.) and Ha(.) given in equations (13) and (14).14 We adopt the
estimation technique deﬁned in Section 3.3.
All the explanatory variables in equations (13) and (14) are endogenous, so we need to
use instruments. Since U and V are unobserved newspaper characteristics, we choose our
instruments from city level demographic variables, see Rosse (1970); Ferguson (1983); Fan
(2013). We instrument daily price with city area in square miles. Rosse (1970) as well as
Ferguson (1983) mention that the city area in square miles can reﬂect higher distribution costs.
Hence as a cost side variable it could be correlated with price but should be independent
of the unobserved newspaper characteristics in the reader demand equation. Moreover, as
pointed out in George (2007) local retail advertising makes up 45% of the total newspaper
advertising which makes city level retail sales a good candidate to instrument advertising
share in the demand equation of the readers.15 We use wages in the printing industry at the
county level as an instrument for ad rate. Wages in printing industry would aﬀect the ad rate
in the newspaper since it aﬀects the cost, but it should be independent of the unobserved
newspaper characteristics for the advertising side. Finally to instrument the readers’ share in
the advertising demand we use the city level percentage of population below the poverty level.
14It should be noted that our main object is to estimate network eﬀects on each side nonparametrically.
For this reason, we give our attention to the functions of interest, ϕ and ψ, and leave a more complex analysis
for future work.
15The relation between advertising demand and local retail sales is also established by Rosse (1970) and
Ferguson (1983).
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Since this is an income related variable it will be correlated with the demand of readers for the
newspaper but independent of the unobservable newspaper characteristics in the advertising
demand equation. Correlation of income and/or income related variables with circulation
has already been established by Ferguson (1983) and Fan (2013). We check the correlation
of the instruments with the endogenous variables. The correlation coeﬃcient between the
cover price and city area in square miles is equal to 0.006 while the correlation coeﬃcient
between the advertising share and city level retail sales is equal to −0.22. For the advertising
demand equation, the correlation coeﬃcient of price and readers’ share with the corresponding
instruments are equal to 0.01 and −0.15, respectively.
We use a rule of thumb to construct the bandwidth parameters. The regularization param-
eters γrn and γ
a
n are chosen by the data-based selection rule of regularization parameter pro-
posed in Florens and Sokullu (2014). Furthermore, since the survival functions are monotonic,
we monotonized these functions (Hr and Ha) both by isotonisation and by rearrangement,
after the estimation.16 We report the results where the monotonization is done by rearrange-
ment since it gives better results for the monotonization of probability distribution functions
compared to other existing methods, as is pointed out by Chernozhukov et al. (2010). Finally,
we construct pointwise bootstrap conﬁdence intervals for the estimated functions. We obtain
the conﬁdence interval with 500 replications of bootstrap in pairs.17 In estimation with the
bootstrapped data, the values of the regularization and bandwidth parameters are ﬁxed at
the levels that we use in the original estimation.
The results are given in Figures 1 and 2.18
The estimated network externality functions do not exhibit the same pattern. The network
eﬀect of advertisers, ϕ is decreasing up to 40% of the ad share. Up to 30% of ad share it
takes positive values, and after that point, it takes negative values. In our set up, the share
of agents joining the platform is given by the survival function of their net beneﬁts and the
survival function is decreasing in its arguments. So, it means that, up to an advertiser share
16For isotonisation and rearrangement, see Chernozhukov et al. (2009).
17Bootstrap in pairs is performed by resampling the data directly by replacement. We do bootstrap in pairs
since all the explanatory variables in the model are endogenous. (See Horowitz, 2001; Flachaire, 2005)
18We also present estimation results without monotonization and pointwise bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
in the Online Appendix E.
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of 30%, increasing the share of advertising in the newspaper, increases the threshold beneﬁt
level, br, and thus decreases the survival function. Hence the readers of the newspapers in
our sample do not like too few advertisements. They start to get beneﬁt after 30% market
share of the advertisers. This beneﬁt keeps increasing until 40% and after that point it starts
decreasing. So the beneﬁt that the readers get from adverts starts to decrease after a threshold
point, as expected. Our result are consistent with the previous literature. In his seminal
paper Rosse (1970) show that circulation demand depends positively on advertising. In a
more recent study with Dutch newspapers Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) concluded the same.
However, our nonparametric result further concludes that this positive eﬀect decreases if the
share of advertisements goes above 40%. This result can be explained by two eﬀects. First,
although the readers like advertisements they care more about the content of the newspaper.
Second, as the number of advertisements in the newspaper increases, it causes a congestion
eﬀect as it becomes harder for the readers to ﬁnd the information they are seeking from the
advertisements. On the other side of the market, when we look at the estimated curves for
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Figure 1: Estimated functions for reader demand equation after monotonization of Hr by rearrange-
ment
the advertiser demand, Figure 2, again we see that the network externality function ψ of
readers changes its sign over the interval. Up to a readership share of 0.2%, ψ takes positive
values meaning that it decreases the survival function. However, after 0.2%, the beneﬁts of
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advertisers are increasing with the share of readership up to 0.8%. So, we can conclude that
advertisers do not beneﬁt from advertising in a magazine with a very low level of readership.
Another point worth noting is that, as for the ϕ this network eﬀect function also follows a
nonmonotonic pattern. The beneﬁt of advertisers starts decreasing with the readership of
more than 0.8%. This result may seem controversial to the results obtained in the previous
literature. However, as concluded by Thompson (1989) advertisers also care about the proﬁle
of the readership. In our data set this high level of circulation may consist of proﬁles that are
not particularly looked for by the advertisers thus their beneﬁt start to decrease. Note that it
is not only the price or the number of the pages that the newspaper chooses to maximize its
proﬁt but also the content and position of the newspaper for several dimensions, e.g. political
position. Thus a high circulation can be a signal for a more moderate newspaper which is not
selecting readers and leading the advertiser demand to decrease.
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Figure 2: Estimated functions for advertiser demand equation after monotonization of Ha by rear-
rangement
We estimate the demand equations using diﬀerent set of instruments to check the robust-
ness of our results. We present the results in Online Appendix F. Results of these estimations
expose the same patterns such that the network eﬀect functions are found to be nonlinear
and non-monotone on both sides.
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4.3 Parametric Estimation
In this section we estimate the model for the daily newspaper industry parametrically.
The parametric speciﬁcation of the network eﬀect functions take into account the results
obtained using the nonparametric speciﬁcation. Using the same set of explanatory variables,
we estimate the system of equations in (13) and (14) simultaneously using GMM. The results
we obtain are consistent with the results of the nonparametric estimation.
4.3.1 Model Specification
To do our analysis with a parametric model, we need to specify (i) a distribution func-
tion for the net beneﬁts of readers and advertisers, (ii) a functional form for the network
eﬀects, ϕ(.) and ψ(.) and (iii) a functional form for the threshold beneﬁt level of readers and
advertisers.
First of all for the distribution of net beneﬁts, we have chosen the log-logistic distribution
function which is common in the literature of network diﬀusion models, see Larribeau (1993)
and Feve et al. (2008). Thus, the survival function is given by:
S(X|m,ρ) = 1
1 + (Xm )
ρ
(25)
where m is the scale parameter and ρ is the shape parameter. These parameters can be
estimated in advance or during the estimation of the other parameters. Larribeau (1993)
assumes that ρ is constant over time while m varies and she estimates both of the parameters
before estimating the demand equations. Feve et al. (2008) assume that they are constant
and are equal to 1. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we also assume that both
parameters are equal to 1. Secondly, we need to approximate the unknown functions ϕ(.)
and ψ(.) by some parametric form. To do this, we use our nonparametric estimation results.
We choose a third order polynomial form for reader demand equation and a second order
polynomial form for advertiser demand equation. Thus:
ϕ(Na) = α0 + α1N
a + α2(N
a)2 + α3(N
a)3 (26)
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ψ(N r) = θ0 + θ1N
r + θ2(N
r)2 (27)
Finally we need to choose a functional form for the threshold net beneﬁt levels of the two
sides. We decide to use an exponential function which will make the threshold beneﬁt level
nonnegative:
br = f(Na,Xβ,U) = exp(ϕ(Na) +Xβ + U) (28)
equivalently for the advertisers’ side:
ba = f(N r,Wγ, V ) = exp(ψ(N r) +Wγ + V ) (29)
To be consistent with the nonparametric analysis, we used the same explanatory variables,
daily price and ad rate of the newspaper.
The simultaneous demand system to be estimated is:
log
(
1−N r
N r
)
= α0 + α1N
a + α2(N
a)2 + α3(N
a)3 + βP r + U (30)
log
(
1−Na
Na
)
= θ0 + θ1N
r + θ2(N
r)2 + γP a + V (31)
4.3.2 Estimation
Using the speciﬁcation above, we estimate the demand equations, (30) and (31) simul-
taneously by GMM using the same instruments as before. Moreover, following Fan (2013),
we use city level demographic characteristics such as percentage of females in the popula-
tion, percentage of whites in the population, home ownership rate in the city, as additional
instruments in both equations. We assume that these city level demographic variables are
predetermined and are not correlated with the unobserved newspaper characteristics in either
of the demand equations. P-value of the Hansen’s J-statistic is 0.2 so we can not reject the
orthogonality of instruments and the error terms. The estimation results are given in Tables
(2) and (3).
All of our estimated parameters are signiﬁcant at the 10% level and have the expected sign
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Table 2: Estimation Results for the Reader Demand
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-stat p-value
constant α0 10.58 2.50 4.23 < .0001
share of advertisers α1 -48.34 23.02 -2.10 0.0381
(share of advertisers)2 α2 96.75 51.81 1.87 0.0646
(share of advertisers)3 α3 -62.06 36.46 -1.70 0.0916
cover price β 3.81 2.04 1.86 0.0651
Table 3: Estimation Results for the Advertiser Demand
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-stat p-value
constant θ0 1.06 0.21 5.07 < .0001
share of readers θ1 -1.62 0.39 -4.10 < .0001
(share of readers)2 θ2 3.91 1.59 2.47 0.0151
ad rate γ 3.37 1.70 1.98 0.0503
For readability, estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors of Nr (θ1), (N
r)2 (θ2) and
P a (γ) are multiplied by 10−2, 10−3 and 103, respectively.
in the readers’ demand equation. The coeﬃcient on price is found to be positive, meaning
that an increase in the cover price will increase the threshold beneﬁt function, br, thus leading
to a decrease in demand. When we examine the estimated network eﬀect function, ϕˆ, we see
that our results are in line with the nonparametric estimate of ϕ in the sense that it is
non-monotonic and can be approximated by a third order polynomial.
For the advertising demand equation, all of the estimated parameters, except the coeﬃcient
on P a, are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The estimated coeﬃcient of P a is signiﬁcant at the
10% level. It is estimated to be positive. Hence, an increase in the ad rate will increase the
threshold beneﬁt function of advertisers, ba leading to a decrease in advertiser demand, since
the survival Sa is decreasing in its arguments. The estimation result for the ψ function is
also in line with what we obtained in Section 4.2. Advertiser demand is increasing in the
readership share until 1.8% then it starts to decrease. Moreover up to 0.8% of readership,
the network eﬀect is positive which increases threshold beneﬁt function thus decreases the
advertising demand. These numbers are found to be much smaller by the nonparametric
estimation.19
To check the robustness of the nonlinear and nonmonotone network eﬀects result, we
19Given the parameter estimates we also compute ∂S
r
∂Na
∂Sa
∂Nr
for each observation and then we take its mean.
It is equal to 0.5005, hence Assumption 7 is satisﬁed on average.
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include more explanatory variables in each equation. The estimation results are given in
Online Appendix G. The nonlinear and non-monotone network eﬀects on both sides are robust
to the addition of these variables.20
5 A Numerical Illustration
In this section we present a numerical example to demonstrate the importance of a correct
speciﬁcation of the network eﬀects. To do this we estimate two parametric speciﬁcations.
In the ﬁrst one, the network eﬀect function in reader demand is speciﬁed as a third order
polynomial while the network eﬀect function in advertiser demand is speciﬁed as a second
order polynomial as in the model given by Equations (30) and (31). In the second one, network
eﬀects in both demand functions are speciﬁed linearly. The second speciﬁcation is given by
the following equations:
log
(
1−N r
N r
)
= α0 + α1N
a + βP r + U (32)
log
(
1−Na
Na
)
= θ0 + θ1N
r + γP a + V (33)
We estimate the equations in each model simultaneously by GMM and we use the same
set of instruments as in the previous section for both models. The estimation results of the
second model are presented in Table 6 in Online Appendix G. All the estimated parameters,
except the coeﬃcient of daily price are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The p-value of daily price
is slightly higher than 0.05. In this model as well, readers are found to be ad-lovers and an
increase in the price level of the newspaper decreases the reader demand. On the other side of
the market, the advertising demand increases with circulation and decreases with ad rate.21
We use the estimated parameters from both models to compute the mark-ups given in
20In the Online Appendix G we also present the graphs of ϕˆ and ψˆ estimated parametrically as well as we
present the plots present plots which show parametric and nonparametric estimates of ϕ and ψ in one graph.
21Given the parameter estimates we also compute ∂S
r
∂Na
∂Sa
∂Nr
for each observation and then we take its mean.
It is equal to 0.2785, hence Assumption 7 is satisﬁed on average.
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equations (7) and (8) at each data point. We then take the means of the computed mark-ups.
First of all, in both cases we ﬁnd a negative average mark-up on readers’ side and a positive
average mark-up on advertisers’ side which is not a surprising outcome in two-sided markets.
Secondly, as can be seen from equations (7) and (8), the mark-ups depend on each other, thus
a speciﬁcation error on one side will eﬀect the estimated mark-ups on both sides (on top of the
fact that diﬀerent speciﬁcation for one equation may eﬀect the value of estimated parameters
in the other equation, too.). Our results conﬁrm these facts. The estimated mark-ups for
both sides are diﬀerent for diﬀerent models. Estimated average mark-up on readers’ side is
more than 100% lower in the ﬁrst model and average mark-up on advertisers’ side is found to
67% higher in the ﬁrst model.
This numerical illustration shows ﬁrst the importance of functional speciﬁcations in em-
pirical analysis and that an analysis which is done under a wrong speciﬁcation will lead to
erroneous conclusions and second how nonparametric approaches can be used as a ﬁrst step
to guide the researcher on functional form speciﬁcation. These are especially important from
a regulatory point of view. If the analysis in Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) is considered,
where they analyze the market power of Italian newspapers, an error coming from this type
of speciﬁcation may reverse their results. The competitive behavior on the advertising side
could have been found to be collusive if the network eﬀects were allowed to be nonlinear.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a semi-parametric empirical model for two sided markets, more
speciﬁcally for the local daily newspaper industry in the U.S. We specify the network ex-
ternalities nonparametrically to be able to capture the nonlinearities and nonmonotonicities.
The distribution functions of beneﬁts of readers and advertisers are not speciﬁed and are left
to be estimated, as well. The model is estimated with nonparametric IV estimation. We get
two main results: First of all, the structural model is supported by the data since we obtain
well behaved demand curves by nonparametric instrumental variables estimation without any
restriction. Secondly, network eﬀects on both sides are nonlinear and nonmonotone.
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Using our nonparametric estimation results, we make parametric approximations for the
network eﬀect functions and re-estimate the model by GMM. We ﬁnd that with a paramet-
ric speciﬁcation the network externality function on the reader side is linear while on the
advertiser side it is nonlinear.
This paper has many contributions. First of all, the nonparametric estimation method is
a contribution as an extension to Florens and Sokullu (2014). Secondly, nonparametric spec-
iﬁcation and estimation have never been used in the empirical two sided markets literature.
Finally, it proves both by nonparametric and parametric estimations that the network eﬀects
in the daily newspaper industry are neither linear nor monotone. This result indeed may have
important implications for policy analysis.
The analysis uses cross-sectional data so a natural extension, nonparametric analysis with
panel data is left for future work. Moreover, no dynamic model has been considered in the
empirical two sided market literature. A dynamic model based on network diﬀusion models
is a very interesting future research topic. Finally, the estimation method presented in this
paper can be applied to any industry with network externalities.
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